

The Hindu Important News Articles For UPSC CSE

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Page 01: GS III : Indian Economy/ Preliminary Examination

According to recent data released by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), India's industrial activity grew at a five-month high rate of 5.1% in May 2026. The main reason for this growth is the strong performance observed in the manufacturing, electricity, and consumer goods sectors. Along with this, the government has made a significant structural change in the calculation of the Index of Industrial Production (IIP), under which the Producer Price Index (PPI) has been introduced in place of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). This step will help in a more accurate evaluation of the country's economic growth.

Key Points & Analysis

Changes in the Base Year and Methodology of IIP:

- The government has changed the base year for the IIP series to 2022-23 so that it can be more aligned with current economic priorities.
- To measure value-based outputs, the Producer Price Index (PPI) has now been adopted instead of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI).
- According to experts, the inclusion of PPI will lead to significant improvements in the growth data of sectors like manufacturing, which could eventually lead to revisions in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures as well.

Sectoral Performance:

- **Manufacturing Sector:** This sector recorded a growth of 5.5% in May. Although this is slightly lower compared to April (6.1%), it has significantly improved compared to May of the previous year (4.2%).
- **Electricity & Gas Supply:** It witnessed a two-year high growth of 9.9%. The main reason for this was the delay in the monsoon and increased temperatures (heat) across the country, which led to a massive surge in electricity demand.
- **Mining & Quarrying:** This sector saw a decline for the fifth consecutive month and contracted by 1.6% in May, which is a matter of concern.

Signs of Consumption Revival:

- Consumer durables grew at a rate of 7.2% and non-durables at 3.6%, reflecting an improvement in domestic demand and rural/urban consumption.

Industrial output growth hits 5-month high of 5.1%

Strong show by manufacturing, electricity, capital, and consumer goods sectors drives growth; mining and quarrying sector contracts for fifth straight month as govt. further tweaks IIP series

T.C.A. Sharad Raghavan
NEW DELHI


Growth in industrial activity quickened to a five-month high of 5.1% in May, buoyed by stronger performances by the manufacturing, electricity, capital goods, and consumer goods sectors, the latest government data show.

While releasing the data, the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation also said that it has further tweaked the new series of the Index of Industrial Production (IIP), which had first been released on June 1. The new series has an updated base year of 2022-23 and incorporates new data sources.

It explained that it has decided to discontinue the use of the Wholesale Price

Growth accelerates

Growth in the Index of Industrial Production



SOURCE: MOSPI

Index (WPI) in the measurement of some value-based outputs in the IIP and has instead adopted the Producer Price Index (PPI) for the purpose. "Accordingly, the present release supersedes the earlier WPI-based IIP 2022-23 series released on 1st June 2026," the release said. "Users are advised to use the PPI-based IIP series

presented in this release for all analytical, research, and policy purposes."

According to Rahul Agrawal, principal economist at the ICRA, this change has "led to material changes in growth across segments such as manufacturing and is also likely to lead to revisions in the GDP data". The manufacturing sector grew 5.5% in

May, down from 6.1% in April but faster than the 4.2% growth registered in May last year.

"Manufacturing has grown by 5.5% which can be attributed to a revival in consumption – both [consumer] durables and non-durables have done well at 7.2% and 3.6%, respectively," Madan Sabnavis, chief economist at the Bank of Baroda, said. "Within durables, the auto sector was once again the leader followed by computers and other electronic goods."

The electricity and gas supply category saw growth quicken to a two-year high of 9.9%, driven by a delayed monsoon and higher temperatures. The mining and quarrying sector contracted by 1.6%, the fifth consecutive month of contraction.

Daily News Analysis

- Among durable goods, automobiles (vehicle sector) led the way, followed by computers and other electronic equipment.

UPSC Relevance (Administrative and Economic Importance)

- **Significance of WPI vs PPI:** From the Mains examination perspective, it is important to understand that PPI is more accurate than WPI because it measures changes in the prices of goods and services at the producers' level (excluding taxes and transportation costs). This helps policymakers understand the actual industrial margins.
- **Challenge of Equitable Growth:** Growth in electricity and manufacturing is positive, but the continuous decline in the mining sector indicates that there are some bottlenecks in the raw material supply chain, which need the government's attention.

Conclusion

The 5.1% growth in May 2026 IIP data reflects the resilience emerging in the manufacturing and consumer demand of the Indian economy. However, the continuous contraction of the mining sector remains a policy challenge. The government's adoption of PPI in place of WPI in IIP calculation is a progressive step that will provide more transparent, accurate, and realistic data in the future. This reform will help the Reserve Bank (RBI) in formulating its monetary policies and the government in shaping its fiscal strategies more effectively, ensuring sustainable industrial growth in the country.

UPSC Prelims Exam Study Questions

Question: Consider the following statements regarding the Index of Industrial Production (IIP):

1. The IIP measures changes in the production of a country's industrial sector.
2. The IIP includes the manufacturing, mining, and electricity sectors.
3. The IIP is used as a short-term indicator of economic activity.

Which of the above statements is/are correct?

- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 2 and 3 only
- (c) 1 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2, and 3

Ans: (d)

UPSC Mains Practice Questions

Question: Discuss the rationale for adopting the Producer Price Index (PPI) instead of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) in the calculation of India's Index of Industrial Production (IIP), as well as its potential economic impacts. (10Marks, 150Words)

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Page 06 : GS II : Social Justice / Preliminary Examination

The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) has provided significant relaxations in the rules of the proposed Three-Language Policy under the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 for the current academic session (2026-27). The board has given relief to those students of classes 7, 8, and 9 who were already studying two foreign languages. Additionally, the current batch of class 10 has been completely exempted from this new policy. This decision reflects flexibility and a student-centric approach in the practical implementation of education policy.

Key Points & Analysis

Major Relaxations in the Policy:

- **Exemption for Class 10:** Students of class 10 for the academic session 2026-27 will not have to follow the new policy; they will continue their studies with the old two-language system.
- **Relief for Foreign Language Students:** Students who were already studying two foreign/non-Indian languages (such as English and French) in classes 7, 8, and 9 will not be forced to drop them. They can continue with both, provided they add an Indian language as their third language.
- **Internal Assessment:** The examination for the third language (R3) for class 9 will not be conducted by the board; instead, its evaluation will be entirely through school-based internal assessment. Even when these students move to class 10, they will not be required to take a board exam in the third language.

Clarifications and Scenarios for Class 9:

- If a student is already studying two Indian languages (such as Hindi and Tamil), they can choose any other Indian language or a foreign language (such as English or French) as the third language.
- If a student is studying one Indian and one foreign language (such as Tamil and English), the third language will compulsorily be an Indian language.

Exempted Categories:

- Children with Special Needs (CWSN), CBSE schools located outside India, and foreign students returning to India have been exempted from this three-language policy.
- Apart from this, if parents migrate to another state, students can continue with their old language combination.

Availability of Resources:

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CBSE relaxes 3-language policy for Classes 7, 8, 9

The current 2026-27 batch of Class 10 will not have to follow the new language policy, the Board says; in Class 9, the third language will be evaluated only by an school-based internal assessment

Maitri Porecha
NEW DELHI

Students currently in Classes 7, 8, and 9 who have already opted for two foreign languages will continue with them, while also studying an additional Indian language (Bharatiya Bhasha), the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) said in the revised guidelines issued on Monday.

The Board, in a circular issued in May, had said that students in Class 9 too would have to adopt the three-language policy, where two of three languages they learn should be native to India. Following this, parents of students who were learning foreign languages had protested against the abrupt switch.

Rule relaxed

Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan stated last week that students in Classes 7, 8, and 9 who have taken foreign languages could continue their studies in their respective selected options.

The current batch of Class 10 will not have to follow the new language policy and will continue with the old system of two languages, the Board said.



Concessions made: NEP'20 recommends learning 3 languages, with at least 2 of the 3 languages being native to India.

low the new language policy and will continue with the old system of two languages, the Board said.

The current batches studying in Classes 7, 8, and 9 would not be required to give Board examination in third language when they progress to Class 10, the statement added.

For Class 9, the third language (R3) will be assessed by the school through an internal school-based assessment.

The National Education Policy (NEP), 2020, recommends learning three languages, with at least two of the three languages being native to India.

The CBSE, in its press statement on Monday, said the introduction of the

third language (R3) in Secondary Stage (Classes 9 and 10) is an extension of language learning from the Middle Stage (Classes 6 to 8). The CBSE said that no third language is required to be taken by Class 10 students during 2026-27.

Every student in Class 9 would study three languages. Of these two languages, at least two would be Bharatiya Bhashas.

Clarification for Class 9

The CBSE also provided examples to offer clarity for students in Class 9. For example, if a student already studies two Indian languages, for instance Hindi and Tamil, they can choose as third language another Indian language or

a non-native language such as English or French.

A student studying one Indian language and one non-native language (for example Tamil and English), may choose any Indian language as the third language (R3).

A student studying two non-native languages for example English and French), as a special one-time relaxation, may continue with those two non-native languages and need to add one Indian language as third language (R3).

The CBSE and NCERT will provide grade-appropriate learning resources to help students learn the third language, the press release states.

The dedicated R3 textbooks for Class 6 in 22 Scheduled Bharatiya Bhashas are being made available on www.ncert.nic.in.

Some categories exempted from the three-language policy are children with special needs, CBSE schools outside India, and foreign students returning to India. If guardians migrate to another State, the student may continue with the existing combination of languages.

Daily News Analysis

- NCERT and CBSE together will provide appropriate learning material to help the students. Dedicated textbooks for class 6 for the 22 scheduled Indian languages included in the 8th Schedule of the Constitution are being made available on the NCERT website.

UPSC Relevance (Administrative and Socio-Economic Importance)

- **Cooperative Federalism and Localization:** NEP 2020 promotes multilingualism and the preservation of Indian languages. The mandate to learn at least two Indian languages strengthens the country's cultural diversity and promotes linguistic identity.
- **Implementation Challenges:** The sudden implementation of the policy in May had caused dissatisfaction among parents and students. This relaxation given by the government and CBSE demonstrates how essential 'bottom-up feedback' and 'pragmatism' are while implementing public policy.
- **Global vs. Local Balance:** Foreign languages (such as French, German, etc.) have their own importance in the modern global economy. This new amendment establishes a balance (Middle Path) between keeping students globally competitive and keeping them connected to their cultural roots (Indian languages).

Conclusion

This temporary reform introduced by CBSE in the three-language policy is an excellent example of policy flexibility. This step ensures that in the process of achieving the far-reaching and progressive goals of the National Education Policy 2020, students do not face any sudden additional mental or academic pressure. However, to make this policy completely successful in the future, the appointment of qualified language teachers in schools and the timely creation of quality textbooks should be the main priority for the government, so that linguistic inclusion can be implemented smoothly.

UPSC Prelims Exam Study Questions

Question: Which of the following is not an objective of the National Education Policy 2020?

- (a) Promoting multilingualism
- (b) Preserving Indian languages
- (c) Encouraging education solely in the English medium
- (d) Developing a holistic and flexible education system

Ans: c)

UPSC Mains Exam Study Questions

Question: Outline the key objectives of the Three-Language Policy under the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 and analyze the challenges associated with its effective implementation. **(10 Marks, 150 Words)**

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Page 06 : GS II : Governance & Social Justice / Preliminary Examination

With effect from July 1, 2026, the Central Government is going to implement the 'Viksit Bharat - Rozgar aur Aajeevika Guarantee Mission (Gramin)' i.e., VB-G RAM G in place of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Following its draft rules issued on May 22, several states (including BJP-ruled states) and experts have raised serious concerns over its financial model and administrative provisions. This step is being considered a major shift in India's 'Cooperative Federalism' and rural social security framework.

Main Differences Between VB-G RAM G and MGNREGA

To understand the reasons for the states' opposition, it is essential to know the differences between the two systems:

- **Demand-driven vs. Supply-driven:** MGNREGA was a 'demand-driven' scheme, where providing employment upon demanding work was a legal obligation of the government. In contrast, VB-G RAM G is a 'supply-driven' scheme, in which the central government will fix a specific budget ceiling (cap) based on 'objective criteria'.
- **Increase in Working Days:** Under the new law, the number of guaranteed working days has been increased from 100 days to 125 days.
- **End of Universality:** MGNREGA was universally applicable to all rural households in the country. Under Section 5(1) of the new law, the central government will decide in which rural areas of which states this scheme will be implemented.
- **Blackout Period:** The new scheme has a provision to pause the program for up to 60 days during the peak agricultural season to maintain the availability of laborers in rural areas.

Why Are States Opposing This Scheme? (Key Points)

States like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Punjab, and Uttarakhand have opposed this scheme on the following grounds:

1. Increased Financial Burden

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Why are States opposing VB-G RAM G

EXPLAINER

Sobhana K. Nair

On July 1, the Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Aajeevika Mission (Gramin) (VB-G RAM G) will become operational, replacing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). The Union Rural Development Ministry notified the draft rules for the new employment scheme on May 22, giving a month to stakeholders to submit their feedback.

The difference

The VB-G RAM G marks a shift from a "demand-driven framework" to a "supply-driven scheme". Under the new system, allocations will be capped within a fixed budget determined by the Union government based on "objective parameters".

While the new Act increases the number of guaranteed workdays from

100 to 125, it also significantly raises the financial burden on States from the current 10% share to 40% of total expenditure. Under the MGNREGA, the Union government was responsible for 100% of the labour wages and 75% of the material wages. In practice, this translated to a 90:10 cost share between the Centre and the States.

Section 5(1) empowers the Union government to "notify rural areas in a State" where the scheme will be implemented. This is a departure from the MGNREGA, which was universal. Another departure from the MGNREGA is that the new law allows for a blackout period, pausing the programme during peak agricultural seasons to "facilitate availability of labour".

Objections by the States

At least three States – Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand, two of them with BJP-led governments – questioned the shift in



At least three States have raised questions about the shift in the financial model of VB-G RAM G.

the financial model, which now requires a majority of States to bear 40% of the total expenditure, in contrast to the MGNREGA.

Five States have sought a revision of wage rates, and four have aired reservations over the provision of 60 non-working days during the peak agricultural season.

Bihar has sought that wages should increase from the present ₹255 to ₹413. Jammu & Kashmir, meanwhile, wants an in-

crease in wages from ₹272 to ₹311. Both Jharkhand and Punjab argued that wages should be competitive and in line with market conditions. Uttarakhand underlined the tough landscape that workers have to work on and sought a compensatory hike. Nearly all States have highlighted delays in clearing the wage and material bill by the Centre.

Centre to hold power

One of the key concerns raised by academics and activists is that the VB-G RAM G gives disproportionate power to the Centre. As per the draft rules on inter-State distribution of funds, the Union government will adopt objective parameters utilised for horizontal devolution among States as recommended by the 16th Finance Commission. The exact application methodology is determined at the discretion of the Union government, a clause, flagged as concerning.

Daily News Analysis

- Under MGNREGA, the central government used to bear 100% of the worker wages and 75% of the material costs, keeping the actual expenditure ratio between the center and states at 90:10.
- Under VB-G RAM G, the financial share of the states has been increased to 40%. Most states, especially backward and poor states, do not have the resources to bear this additional financial burden.

2. Dissatisfaction Over Wage Rates

- Many states believe that the current wage rates do not align with the actual market situation and inflation.
- Bihar has demanded an increase in wages from ₹255 to ₹413.
- Jammu and Kashmir has demanded it to be increased from ₹272 to ₹311.
- Punjab and Jharkhand have argued that an increase in wage rates is necessary for market competition, while Uttarakhand has demanded a 'compensatory hike' due to hilly and difficult geographical conditions.

3. Objection to the 'Blackout Period' (60 Non-working Days)

- Four states have opposed the provision of halting the scheme for 60 days during the busy agricultural season.
- Experts and states believe that this will impact the livelihood of landless and poor laborers during that period, who do not get adequate work or proper wages in the agricultural sector.

4. Over-Centralization of Power

- Excessive discretionary powers have been given to the central government in this scheme.
- The criteria of the 16th Finance Commission will be used as the basis for the distribution of funds among states, but the methodology of its implementation will depend entirely on the discretion of the central government, thereby affecting the autonomy of the states.

5. Delays in Clearance of Dues

- Almost all states have complained that there is already a considerable delay by the central government in approving wage and material bills, which escalates the crisis at the rural level. This problem could become more severe under the new model.

Conclusion

The objective of VB-G RAM G is to strengthen livelihoods by increasing rural working days (125 days) and to save the agricultural sector from a labor crisis. However, increasing the financial share of states from 10% to 40% and shifting the scheme away from being demand-driven to budget-limited could weaken the rural social security apparatus.

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Daily News Analysis

From the UPSC perspective, to make any major reform successful in a welfare state like India, adherence to the principle of 'Cooperative Federalism' is essential. The central government should take the feedback of the states seriously, make the distribution of the financial burden more flexible, and revise the wage rates according to regional realities, so that the rights of the rural poor can be protected.

UPSC Prelims Exam Study Questions

Question: If an employment guarantee scheme were changed from 'demand-driven' to 'supply-driven', what would be its most likely impact?

- (a) Everyone seeking employment would legally find work.
- (b) Employment availability would be more dependent on budgetary allocations and government allocations.
- (c) The financial responsibility of states would be eliminated.
- (d) Rural wages would automatically increase.

Ans: b)

UPSC Mains Practice Questions

Question: 'The shift from a demand-based employment guarantee model to a supply-based model could alter the nature of rural social security.' Analyze this statement in the context of VB-G RAM G. (10 Marks, 150 Words)

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Page 10 :GS II &III : IR and Indian Economy / Preliminary Examination

In February 2025, India and the US announced that they were working towards a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), which was later attempted to be converted into an Interim Trade Deal in February 2026. However, due to policy differences such as agriculture and Russian oil imports, legal battles in Washington, and fresh investigations initiated by the Trump administration, this agreement has not been able to be implemented so far. India-US economic relations are extremely crucial for global geopolitics and 'strategic partnership', but the current trade deadlock has emerged as a major challenge between the two countries.

On the delay in India-U.S. trade deal

India and the U.S. announced in February 2025 that they would work towards a Bilateral Trade Agreement, but differences over agriculture and Russian oil, along with legal battles in Washington and investigations initiated by the Trump administration, have clouded its prospects

EXPLAINER

T.C.A. Sharad Raghavan

The story so far:

India and the U.S. in February 2025 announced that they would work towards a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) that was to be finalised by fall 2025. Then, in February 2026, they signed a framework agreement for an interim trade deal that was to be implemented by April-May 2026. Neither deal has come to pass.

Why was the BTA delayed?

Soon after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump announced their intentions to complete a BTA in February 2025, it became clear that a comprehensive deal would be elusive. The talk among government officials was about finalising at least the first tranche of the deal by fall 2025 (September-November 2025).

Talks intensified post April 2025, after Mr. Trump first announced his 'Liberation Day' reciprocal tariffs and then paused them for 90 days so he could negotiate deals with U.S. trade partners. However, despite several meetings, India and the U.S. could not finalise the first tranche, with key sticking points being India's reluctance to open up its agricultural and dairy sectors, and its decision to buy oil from Russia.

In two successive announcements in late July and early August, Mr. Trump raised tariffs on imports from India to 25% and then to 50%, with the latter hike being a penalty for India's Russian oil imports. This decision froze negotiations for a few months before matters thawed once again and talks resumed in October.

What is the interim deal?

Once talks resumed, Mr. Modi and Mr. Trump in February 2026 signed a



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framework for an interim agreement on trade. This was not a trade deal itself, but the framework along which one could be worked out. At the time, Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal expressed his confidence that the deal would be completed by April, or at the latest by early May 2026.

Under the framework, the U.S. was to reduce total tariffs on Indian imports to 18%, providing it a competitive advantage over its competitors. Both sides also committed to providing each other preferential market access in "sectors of respective interest".

Why has this deal been delayed?

Soon after the framework was announced, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the reciprocal tariff system itself, saying the law it was based on – the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of the U.S. – did not allow for such tariffs. That removed a major foundation on which the deal negotiations had taken place.

Since then, the U.S. has taken several decisions that have further added to the tariff uncertainty.

Right after the Supreme Court's decision, Mr. Trump announced that he would be imposing a flat 10% tariff on imports from all countries under the Trade Act of 1974, which he said authorised him to take action to address the U.S.'s ballooning trade deficit. This tariff was temporary, supposed to last 150 days up to July 24. Mr. Trump said he would raise it to 15%, but never did.

The U.S. Court of International Trade deemed these illegal as well, but an appeals court put a stay on that order.

What fresh investigations have added more uncertainty?

In March, the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) said it had initiated two investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act into several of its trade partners that could potentially see further tariffs being imposed on them.

The first investigation against 16

economies, including India, was to see whether these economies were using excess manufacturing capacity to export to the U.S. in a manner that was hurting American businesses.

The second one, against 60 countries including India, was to look into whether these countries had taken "sufficient steps" to prohibit the import of goods produced with forced labour and how the "failure to eradicate" these practices impacts U.S. workers and businesses.

Under the forced labour investigation, the U.S. government in early June proposed to levy a tariff of 12.5% on imports from 54 countries, including India, as they have "failed to impose and effectively enforce" prohibitions on the import of goods produced using forced labour. To be sure, this does not mean the U.S. is saying that India uses forced labour, but that it has not stopped the import of goods that have been manufactured using forced labour.

India has made its representations to the U.S. on this matter and the final hearing is on July 7. The findings of the excess capacity investigations are expected in mid-July.

What is India's stance on the deal?

As repeatedly expressed by Mr. Goyal, India remains committed to finalising a trade deal with the U.S. but is firm about the fact that it should receive a comparative advantage over its competitors as was agreed in February. For this, the Section 301 investigations will have to be completed and the tariffs decided on various countries.

In the meantime, the two sides continue to negotiate on the other non-tariff aspects of the deal, such as enhanced market access, digital trade, supply chain resilience, reduction of non-tariff barriers, and expanded cooperation in strategic sectors. The latest visit by USTR Jamieson Greer to India on June 23-24 did not yield any deadlines.

THE GIST

India and the U.S. missed both the planned 2025 Bilateral Trade Agreement and the 2026 interim deal after disagreements over agriculture, dairy and Russian oil imports, followed by shifting U.S. tariff policies and legal challenges that disrupted negotiations.

New U.S. Section 301 investigations into excess manufacturing capacity and forced-labour-related imports have delayed tariff decisions, while both sides continue negotiating non-tariff issues, with India insisting on a comparative tariff advantage before finalising the deal.

Background of the Trade Agreement

- **February 2025 (Announcement of BTA):** Both countries agreed on a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), which was to be completed by autumn (September-November) 2025.

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Daily News Analysis

- **Tensions and Tariff Hikes:** The talks were halted for some time after the US increased tariffs on imports from India, first to 25% and then to 50% (as a penalty for buying Russian oil).
- **February 2026 (Interim Agreement):** Both countries signed a framework for an interim trade deal, which was to be implemented by April-May 2026. Under this, the US was to reduce tariffs on Indian imports to 18%, giving India a competitive edge.

Main Reasons for the Delay and Deadlock

The following reasons are primarily responsible for the postponement of this strategic agreement:

1. Structural & Policy Differences:

- **Agriculture and Dairy Sector:** India is hesitant to open its vast agriculture and dairy sector to American competition, as it could affect the livelihood of crores of small farmers in the country.
- **Oil Imports from Russia:** Since the Ukraine crisis, the US has taken a tough stance on India's continuous import of crude oil from Russia at discounted rates, which it views as a strategic disagreement.

2. Legal and Judicial Obstacles in the U.S.:

- **Supreme Court Verdict:** The US Supreme Court declared the Trump administration's 'Reciprocal Tariff System' invalid, stating that there is no authority to impose such tariffs under the 'International Emergency Economic Powers Act' (IEEPA). This destroyed the very basis of the interim agreement.
- **Tariff Uncertainty:** Following this, the flat tariff of 10% imposed under the Trade Act 1974 was also ruled illegal by the 'U.S. Court of International Trade' (although an appellate court has stayed this), creating massive uncertainty in US trade policies.

3. Fresh Section 301 Investigations by the Trump Administration:

- In March 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated two major investigations under Section 301 of the 'Trade Act', complicating the matter further:
 - **Excess Manufacturing Capacity:** Investigation against 16 economies, including India, on whether they are using their excess manufacturing capacity to dump goods into the US, thereby hurting US businesses.
 - **Anti-Forced Labour Investigation:** Investigation against 60 countries, including India, on whether they have taken adequate steps to prevent the import of goods made with forced labor. Under this, in June 2026, the US proposed imposing a 12.5% additional tariff on 54 countries, including India.

India's Stance

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Daily News Analysis

- **Demand for Competitive Edge:** According to Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal, India is fully committed to this trade agreement, but India's condition is clear that it must get a 'comparative advantage' compared to its competitors, as agreed in the February 2026 framework.
- **Awaiting Results of Investigations:** India believes that the agreement can take a final shape only when the Section 301 investigations are completed and the status of tariffs applicable to various countries becomes clear.
- **Focus on Non-Tariff Issues:** For now, both countries are continuing discussions on non-tariff aspects such as digital trade, supply chain resilience, reducing non-tariff barriers, and increasing cooperation in strategic sectors (such as semiconductors and defense). These were also discussed during US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer's visit to India in June 2024.

Conclusion

The India-US trade agreement is extremely crucial from the perspective of global trade and 'Indo-Pacific' strategic stability. Currently, domestic legal disputes and protectionist measures (like Section 301 investigations) of US trade policy have slowed down the negotiations.

From the UPSC perspective, this situation demonstrates that despite closeness in strategic relations (such as Quad and iCET), the national interests of both countries often clash on the economic and trade fronts. To resolve this deadlock, both sides will have to adopt a 'give and take' approach, where the US needs to understand India's developing economic constraints (agriculture/dairy) and India must establish itself as a reliable and rules-based partner in global supply chains at multilateral forums.

UPSC Prelims Practice Questions

Question: 'Non-Tariff Barriers' refers to—

- (a) Only an increase in customs duty
- (b) Restrictions imposed on imports and exports other than customs duties, such as standards, licenses, quotas, etc.
- (c) Only export subsidies
- (d) Only currency devaluation

Ans: b)

UPSC Mains Practice Questions

Question: Briefly assess the role of economic and trade cooperation in the India-US strategic partnership. **(10 Marks, 150 Words)**

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In its June 2026 annual report (Yearbook), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shared a significant fact. According to the report, out of India's estimated stockpile of 190 nuclear warheads, 12 weapons have been classified under the 'operationally deployed' category for the first time. This means that these weapons are mated with their delivery systems (missiles or submarines) and are in a state of ready-to-use availability with the military. Although this has made big headlines globally, it does not represent a shift in India's 'No First Use' policy, but rather reflects the maturity of India's 'Second-Strike Capability'.

Difference Between Stockpile and Operational Deployment

From a strategic perspective, it is essential to understand the difference between these two states:

- **De-mated State (Traditional Stance):** Historically, India has always kept its nuclear weapons 'de-mated', meaning the nuclear warheads and the missiles carrying them were kept in separate locations under secure civilian control. This was intended to prevent accidents and to signal restraint globally.
- **Operational Deployment:** This means that the warheads have been mated with the missiles or fighter aircraft/submarines and handed over to the military. This by no means implies preparation for war, but rather signifies that if the country faces a nuclear attack, a swift retaliatory action can be taken.

Real Significance of the Deployment of 12 Nuclear Weapons (Key Implications)

The analysis of this SIPRI report can be understood through the following points:

1. Strengthening of the 'No First Use' (NFU) Principle:

- India's nuclear policy is based on 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' and NFU. India reiterated this commitment during the high-level United Nations (UN) meeting in September 2025 as well.
- For a country following the NFU policy, it is most crucial that even after absorbing the enemy's first nuclear strike, it remains secure enough to launch a devastating retaliatory counter-attack (Second Strike). This deployment of 12 weapons makes this 'second-strike' capability infallible and credible.

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KEYWORD

What India's 12 'operationally deployed' nuclear warheads really mean

SIPRI's latest assessment shows the maturation of India's second-strike capability rather than a shift away from its long-standing 'no first use' doctrine. The development comes amid a broader global trend of nuclear modernisation and weakening arms-control frameworks.

Shrawani Shagun

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its annual yearbook in June. For the first time, it classified 12 of India's estimated stockpile of 190 nuclear warheads to be operationally deployed, i.e., positioned with active military forces mated with delivery systems and ready for use. This sounds alarming – but the alarm itself may not be warranted. The reason is that India has neither crossed a strategic threshold nor has it abandoned its decades-old 'no first use' policy.

India's promise
India's 'no first use' (NFU) policy is a pillar of its nuclear doctrine and its credible minimum deterrence posture. At the UN High-Level Meeting commemorating the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in September 2025, India's representative Shri George Yousif affirmed India's commitment to NFU and to the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.

The political foundations of the doctrine are intact even as some analysts within India have periodically called for a conditional or hybrid first-use posture. Those calls have not prevailed. Under NFU, India commits to not launching a preemptive nuclear strike. What it needs is the absolute certainty that even after absorbing a nuclear first strike, enough of its nuclear arsenal will survive to deliver a devastating retaliatory blow. This survivability guarantee is what strategists call a second-strike capability, and without it, NFU is not a doctrine but a liability. In other words, the doctrine depends on a force that can survive and retaliate.

The SIPRI report does not indicate a shift towards first use, a lowering of the threshold for nuclear employment or indeed any revision of the political controls that govern India's nuclear weapons. Instead, it documents the maturing of India's ability to credibly deliver the second strike.

Stockpile v. Deployment
This distinction is significant. Possessing a nuclear warhead and deploying it as part of an operational deterrent is not the same thing. For most of its nuclear history, India has kept its warheads in a de-mated state, meaning the warheads were stored separately from their delivery vehicles, in a central storage site and under strict civilian and political oversight. The idea was to maximise safety, reduce the risk of accidental use, and signal restraint to the international community.

Deployment, on the other hand, means a weapon has been paired with a delivery system – a missile, aircraft, or submarine – and positioned with operational military forces in a state of readiness. Again, this does not mean the weapons are about to be used; it means they are configured for use if authorised. A de-mated weapon requires time to prepare and deploy; a mated weapon can, in principle, be launched more quickly.

What SIPRI has recorded when it classified 12 Indian warheads as being deployed is that a small – but no doubt



The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute noticed India's increasing reliance on canisterised Agni-series missiles. FILE PHOTO

significant – fraction of India's arsenal now is being maintained in a state of operational readiness. And SIPRI has linked this assessment to the maturation of India's nuclear triad, particularly its sea-based deterrent, suggesting that a small number of warheads may now be deployed aboard a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (which are also called SSBN) conducting occasional deterrence patrols.

India's Arihant-class submarines have steadily strengthened the survivability of the country's second-strike capability, with additional platforms expected to further consolidate this leg of the triad. SIPRI also noticed India's increasing reliance on canisterised Agni-series missiles. This means the missiles are kept ready with fuel in a sealed cylinder, from which they can be directly fired without further preparations. Canisterisation thus indicates a greater level of operational readiness.

Overall, it seems India's long-envisioned deterrent posture is becoming increasingly operational across land and sea-based delivery systems – but not that the country is on a war footing.

NFU architecture
Bearing in mind India's pursuit of a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence centred on assured retaliation, the maturation of its submarine-based deterrent doesn't depart from NFU but is a means of strengthening it.

A doctrine that relies on retaliation requires forces capable of surviving an adversary's first strike. Land-based missiles, however capable, sit at known and mappable locations. An adversary confident in its intelligence could, in theory, target them in a disarming first strike before a retaliatory order is ever

issued. On the other hand, a stealth submarine operating in the ocean can't be found, tracked or destroyed in time.

This is a fundamental difference – and in fact, ballistic missile submarines provide the most secure second-strike capability available. As the scholar Vipin Narang has written, states pursuing assured retaliation postures must, above all, solve the survivability problem, and sea-basing is the most robust solution available.

India has now done that. With three operational SSBNs sufficient to keep at least one submerged and on patrol at all times, India has closed the central vulnerability any NFU doctrine faces. Manpreet Sethi, distinguished fellow at the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, New Delhi, said, "With the operationalisation of tri SSBNs, it is not surprising that some of India's nuclear warheads now stand mated with delivery platforms. This in no way implies a doctrinal shift. Rather, it makes assured retaliation more credible and, hence, India more confident in its commitment to 'no first use'."

Wider warning
SIPRI's documentation of India's deployment milestone lies within a broader, more concerning global trend. The organisation's 2026 Yearbook observed that states are "increasingly relying on nuclear weapons as instruments of national power", signalling a reversal of decades of gradual progress in disarmament.

As of January this year, the world's nine nuclear-armed states collectively possessed an estimated 12,857 nuclear warheads. China's arsenal has grown to approximately 620 and continues to expand at a pace unmatched by any other

nuclear power. In this context, India's reported deployment of 12 operationally assigned warheads is strategically significant.

India's nuclear choices must be understood from within this evolving security environment. SIPRI has noted that India's modernisation programme is increasingly focused on developing long-range delivery systems capable of reaching targets throughout China – while continuing to account for Pakistan.

With China's arsenal now more than three times the size of Pakistan's estimated stockpile, and Beijing simultaneously expanding its sea-based nuclear deterrent, India's SSBN programme appears directed as much towards maintaining credible deterrence against China as towards preserving stability with Pakistan.

The world that the SIPRI report has described is one in which the post-Cold War nuclear order is under mounting strain. Arms control agreements have weakened or collapsed while competition in areas such as hypersonic delivery systems, artificial intelligence-enabled decision support, missile defence, and anti-submarine warfare continues to intensify.

The risk of miscalculation is correspondingly increasing. India's evolving deterrent posture should therefore be seen not as an isolated development but as part of a wider transformation in the global strategic environment. Policymakers should treat this as a warning that the institutions designed to manage nuclear risk must adapt quickly enough to keep pace with the capabilities now being fielded. (Shrawani Shagun is a researcher focusing on environmental sustainability and space governance)

2. Strengthening of the Nuclear Triad and Maritime Resilience:

- SIPRI has linked this deployment primarily to India's sea-based nuclear deterrence, i.e., SSBNs (Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines).
- Ground-based missile sites are mapped by enemy intelligence agencies and can be destroyed in a first strike. However, it is virtually impossible to locate nuclear submarines like the Arihant-class hiding in the depths of the ocean.
- With India now possessing three operational SSBNs (Tri-SSBN), it can keep at least one submarine deployed on deterrence patrol in the sea at all times, making India's retaliatory strike capability impenetrable.

3. Canisterised Agni Missiles:

- SIPRI has also highlighted India's growing reliance on 'canisterised' Agni-series missiles.
- Canisterisation means that the missile is kept inside a sealed cylinder along with its fuel, fully primed at all times. This allows the missile to be launched in a very short timeframe without any additional preparation, which enhances operational readiness.

4. Strategic Balance in the Context of China and Pakistan:

- Globally, the race for the modernization of nuclear weapons is accelerating. Currently, China's nuclear stockpile has increased to approximately 620 warheads (which is three times larger than Pakistan's stockpile).
- China is not only modernizing its nuclear arsenal but is also expanding its maritime strength. In such a changing security environment, India's steps are primarily essential for developing long-range delivery systems capable of reaching China and for maintaining strategic stability on two fronts (China and Pakistan).

Broader Global Trend and Warning

SIPRI's 2026 report also warns that global nuclear disarmament efforts have weakened and arms control treaties are breaking down. The world's 9 nuclear-armed states collectively possess approximately 12,187 nuclear weapons. In this era of hypersonic missiles, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based decision systems, and anti-submarine warfare, the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation has increased. India's deployment is a protective shield to defend its sovereignty in this volatile global environment.

Conclusion

The declaration of India's 12 nuclear weapons as 'operationally deployed' by SIPRI is not an indication of an aggressive policy or preparation for war. It is a logical culmination of India making its defensive 'second-strike' capability more practical and infallible.

From the UPSC perspective, this development strengthens India's status as a 'realistic and responsible nuclear power'. Given the changing global scenario and the security challenges in the neighborhood, without breaking its 'No First Use' pledge, India has sent a firm message to its adversaries that any misadventure against India will lead to their own destruction. This balance of power is an absolute necessity in today's times to maintain strategic stability.

UPSC Prelims Exam Study Questions

Question: What is meant by 'Nuclear Triad'?

- (a) Production, testing and export of nuclear weapons
- (b) Land, air and sea-based nuclear launch capability
- (c) Nuclear energy, nuclear medicine and nuclear agriculture
- (d) Nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control

Ans: b)

UPSC Mains Practice Questions

Question: Explain the concept of 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' while outlining the key principles of India's nuclear policy. **(10 Marks, 150 Words)**

Page : 08 : Editorial Analysis

Reforms 3.0 — towards the Bharat rate of growth

For 45 years after Independence, India grew at an anaemic 3% – the infamous “Hindu rate of growth”. Triggered by a balance-of-payments crisis, India found the gumption to liberalise. Within a decade, GDP growth surged. The lesson: crisis breeds reform, and reform breeds exponential outcomes. Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides the same transformational leverage that liberalisation provided in 1991. The question is not whether India can afford to invest – it is whether India can afford not to. After 12 years of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's leadership, India has reached another WhatsApp moment in reform – dare I say, to take it from a Hindu rate of growth to the Bharat rate of growth – 8% and beyond for the next decade.

The case for making tokens free

India has since proven that it can leapfrog entire generations of infrastructure. Aadhaar enrolled 1.38 billion people in a biometric identity system, the largest on earth. UPI now processes 250 billion annual transactions worth \$3.4 trillion, handling 50% of the world's real-time digital payments. Reliance Jio, launched in 2016, added 100 million subscribers in just five months and made mobile data essentially free. How India can replicate its Aadhaar, data availability deluge and UPI miracles in the age of AI – by embracing open models, diversifying compute hardware, and making tokens as free as data.

India spends just about 0.65% of its GDP on research and development (R&D), well below China (2.4%), the United States (3.5%), South Korea (4.9%), and Israel (5.4%). The excuse of the socialist Congress governments of 1947-1991 was: “we can't afford anything more”, which does not and should not apply now. The central question is this: Has the time come to make AI tokens free? If so, how do we do it? Can we begin by making tokens free for the country's top 100 national R&D institutions and 5,000 schools, so that AI becomes a teammate for scientists and students alike?

India spends approximately \$49 billion each year subsidising calories, chemicals, and carbon. The question is whether it is now ready to subsidise cognition. The answer is that it already can – at a fraction of what it spends today. The entire AI token subsidy for the country's top 100 universities and national R&D institutions, along with 5,000 high schools, would cost about \$2 billion annually – roughly 0.06% of GDP. The AI investment is around one-fourteenth of India's food subsidy, one-tenth of its fertilizer subsidy, and less than the amount paid to compensate oil marketing companies for LPG under-recoveries in a single quarter. This is not a moonshot budget. It is a rounding error in India's existing welfare expenditure – but one with the potential to generate transformative, compounding returns.

India does not need more money; it needs new priorities, new frameworks, and some reallocation. First, AI tokens can be funded



Srivatsa Krishna
IAS officer

without cutting a single rupee from existing beneficiaries by merely freezing subsidy growth for a year. (The fertilizer subsidy alone has been compounding at 11% CAGR over the past decade.) Second, India should forge a public-private partnership with hyperscalers such as AWS, Google, and Microsoft, exchanging data centre land, power subsidies, and data sovereignty assurances for free inference capacity. India's 1.4-billion-user market gives it negotiating leverage that few countries can match, though such techno-commercial negotiations, shaped by geopolitics and uncertainty, will require considerable skill. Third, if necessary, paid enterprise tiers can cross-subsidise free access for schools and research institutions.

Free data worked and free tokens will too. The government did not directly subsidise Jio. Instead, it created the right regulatory environment through spectrum auctions, net neutrality, infrastructure sharing, and a controversial long pilot.

The result: data prices fell from about \$3 per GB to \$0.10 in under three years. The same playbook can apply to AI tokens. Create the right conditions, and the market will deliver abundance. India's role is not to write the cheque, but to make it unnecessary.

Hosting models

India must build the competence to host and operate large language models, not merely consume them through APIs from San Francisco or Beijing. With Sarvam, it has already shown that frontier models can be trained on Indian soil. The next step is to host models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Kimi, Llama, and Sarvam on sovereign infrastructure, even if some open-source models originate from China. The models may be free, but the intelligence to host them at scale is not. AI infrastructure should be treated as a strategic national capability, much like what the government has already done for space and nuclear programmes. India should pursue a hybrid strategy that combines sovereign and open-source models to avoid dependence on any single ecosystem. Open-source models offer four key advantages: sovereignty by reducing reliance on foreign APIs that can be restricted overnight; lower costs by eliminating per-token licensing fees, thereby enabling free education and research uses; customisation for Indic languages and cultural contexts; and transparency through auditable model weights for government and defence applications.

Hosting LLMs at national scale is not “just deploy a container”. India must develop deep expertise in availability (multi-region redundancy, 99.99% uptime SLAs for critical government services; latency (<200ms token latency across Tier-2/3 cities); efficiency (like batch scheduling to maximise tokens-per-watt); security (data residency compliance, prompt injection defence, audit trails).

India cannot afford to be locked into a

single-vendor monopoly for its AI compute future. NVIDIA's dominance comes at extraordinary cost – both financial and strategic. NVIDIA controls 80%+ of AI training hardware but creates deep vendor lock-in that extends far beyond hardware. For India to build sovereign AI infrastructure for 1.4 billion people, the math simply does not work at NVIDIA pricing.

India spent relatively little to build UPI; it cannot afford to spend \$50 billion on NVIDIA GPUs. The alternative hardware ecosystem is not just more economical – it is strategically essential. India should adopt a 40:30:30 hardware mix rather than rely on a single vendor. Around 40% should be built on AWS Trainium and AMD for cost-effective inference workloads available in India. Another 30% should use Google TPUs for research, model training, and academic partnerships. The remaining 30% should rely on NVIDIA for specialised training, legacy compatibility, and a domestic silicon hedge.

AI token policy, implementation timeline

India should announce a National AI Token Policy and implement it over the next 24 months. It should begin by signing public-private partnership agreements with AWS, Google, and Microsoft to establish a multi-vendor sovereign compute framework. The first pilot should provide unlimited research tokens to the top 20 IITs and the IISc. As hyperscaler inference capacity comes online, India should open an API sandbox for 500 startups, expand access to 100 universities, and launch an AI literacy pilot across 500 high schools in 10 States. The programme should culminate in the publication of the country's first sovereign Indic AI model benchmarks.

Thereafter India needs to scale the ecosystem through cross subsidies as mentioned above and deploy fine-tuned models into health care, agriculture, judiciary and education. It must follow this up with full deployment at 5,000 high schools and all 22 languages. With this India's token consumption will enter the global top five. In two years, India-trained models will become competitive on international benchmarks and 10,000+ AI-native startups will bloom, rocketing GDP growth.

In sum, India's AI leapfrog is a *sine qua non* for national transformation. India needs to replicate its DPI (digital public infrastructure) miracles in the age of AI by embracing open models, diversifying compute hardware, and making tokens as free as data. India has all the necessary conditions – favourable policies, stable macroeconomy, prodigious talent and technology institutions – to become a global leader in AI applications. The sufficient condition is India's decisive, visionary leadership. It will take three moves. One decade. And a transformed (AI) nation.

The views expressed are personal

GS Paper III: Indian Economy

UPSC Mains Exam Practice Questions: Evaluate the role of the 1991 economic reforms in India's economic growth. Explain the need for 'Reforms 3.0' in the current context. (15 Marks, 250 Words)

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Context : In the initial 45 years post-independence, India's economic growth rate remained stagnant around 3%, which was termed as the 'Hindu rate of growth' in administrative and economic circles. The economic liberalization following the 1991 Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis transformed the country's landscape. In the present times, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is providing India with another similar historic opportunity. Following the last 12 years of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's leadership, India is now on the threshold of 'Reforms 3.0', the objective of which is to take the country to a sustainable growth rate of more than 8%, i.e., the 'Bharat rate of growth'.

Concept and Rationale of 'Free AI Tokens'

The main suggestion of the author (IAS officer Srivatsa Krishna) is that India should replicate the same miracle in the field of AI that it did in the free data revolution through 'Jio' (Reliance Jio).

- **Subsidising Cognition:** India currently spends approximately \$49 billion annually on subsidizing food (calories), fertilizer (chemicals), and fuel (carbon). The time has come for the country to subsidize 'cognition' (meaning AI intelligence).
- **Low Cost, High Impact:** The cost of providing free AI tokens to the country's top 100 research institutions (R&D Institutions) and 5,000 high schools would be around \$2 billion annually, which is a mere 0.06% of India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is 1/14th of the food subsidy and 1/10th of the fertilizer subsidy.
- **Funding Model:** This can be funded by freezing the growth rate of existing subsidies for one year, introducing paid tiers for corporate sectors, or through a PPP (Public-Private Partnership) model with global tech giants (Hyperscalers) to provide free 'Inference Capacity' in exchange for land and power subsidies.

Sovereign Infrastructure and Hosting LLMs

India must not remain merely a consumer of foreign AI technologies; instead, it has to develop sovereign capability:

- **Advantage of Open-Source:** India should host open-source models like 'Sarvam', Llama, or DeepSeek on its sovereign infrastructure. Open-source offers four main benefits: sovereignty (freedom from dependence on foreign APIs), low cost (no token licensing fees), localization (adaptable to Indian languages/cultures), and security (transparent model weights).
- **Technical Expertise:** To run Large Language Models (LLMs) at the national level, India will have to achieve mastery in availability (99.99% uptime), low latency (Latency less than 200ms), efficiency (more tokens with less power), and security (protection against data residency issues and prompt injections).

The Need for Hardware Diversification

Currently, NVIDIA controls more than 80% of the global AI hardware (GPUs) market, which creates a massive 'Vendor Lock-in'. India cannot build an AI framework for 1.4 billion people at NVIDIA's pricing. As an alternative, a 40:30:30 hardware mix should be adopted:

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Daily News Analysis

- **40% Share:** Based on Amazon (AWS Trainium) and AMD, which are suitable for cost-effective inference tasks.
- **30% Share:** Based on Google TPUs, to be utilized for research and academic partnerships.
- **30% Share:** Maintained on NVIDIA, to preserve specialized training, legacy compatibility, and a domestic silicon hedge.

National AI Token Policy and Roadmap (24-Month Timeline)

According to the article, India should announce a 'National AI Token Policy' and implement it in phases:

- **Initial Phase (0-6 months):** Entering into PPP agreements with companies like AWS, Google, and Microsoft for a multi-vendor sovereign compute framework. Providing unlimited research tokens to the top 20 IITs and IISc.
- **Expansion Phase (6-18 months):** Opening API sandboxes for 500 startups, expanding access to 100 universities, and launching AI literacy pilots in 500 schools across 10 states. Publishing India's first sovereign Indic AI model benchmarks.
- **Full Deployment Phase (18-24 months):** Extending it to all 22 official Indian languages and 5,000 high schools. This will place India among the top 5 token consumers globally and lead to the growth of more than 10,000 AI-native startups in the country.

Conclusion

This 'leapfrog' of India in the field of AI is not just a technological advancement, but a sine qua non (an essential condition) for national transformation. Just as India has previously established its technological dominance globally through Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) such as biometric identification systems and UPI, it can similarly establish itself in the era of AI through open models, hardware diversification, and a policy of free tokens.

From the UPSC perspective, under 'Reforms 3.0', India will have to increase investment in 'digital and cognitive capital' while balancing its traditional subsidy (food/fertilizer) priorities. Only through the convergence of a stable macroeconomy, exceptional technical talent, and visionary political will can India achieve the 'Bharat rate of growth' of over 8% in the coming decade and realize its dream of becoming a developed nation.